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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

The court noted that MDEQ based its decision on competent,
material and substantial evidence, and the trial court did not err in
their review of the decision. The City of Romulus, the City of Taylor,
and Wayne County argued that the trial court erred in its review of
MDEQ's actions, but they did not allege any specific error in the trial
court's review. On appeal, this court held that, without a more specific
allegation of error, the trial court was correct in reasoning that
MDEQ's decision was valid.
The court thus affirmed the trial court's decision, finding that the
trial court did not err in its evaluation of the MDEQ's decision to issue
the Part 111 permit allowing EDS to construct their hazardous waste
underground deep injection well facility.
Ryan D. Phillips

Dyball v. Lennox, No. 241296, 2004 WL 345278 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb.
24, 2004) (holding trial court may not consider circumstances
surrounding a grant when interpreting an unambiguous easement for
ingress and egress to a body of water, and right of way in easement did
not give rise to riparian rights).
George and Linda Dyball were riparian owners of property on
Lake Fenton. The Dyball property was subject to an easement that
Edith Crane granted Bob Crane in 1955. William Lennox owned a lot
in Cranewood No. 1 that enjoyed a dominant estate regarding the
easement. Crane's deed provided, "The Easterly 16 feet of the above
described premises being reserved for the use of those parties, their
heirs, assigns, and successors, owning lots in Cranewood No. I
Subdivision... for the purposes of ingress and egress to and from the
premises in which they may have an interest to the water's edge of
Lake Fenton." The Dyballs filed a complaint seeking declaratory
judgment limiting Lennox's easement use for ingress and egress only
and a permanent injunction restraining improper use. The Dyballs
alleged Lennox abused the easement by installing and maintaining a
dock, using the premises to temporarily store boating equipment,
using the premises for recreation, and attempting to exercise general
dominion over the premises.
Lennox argued that factual
circumstances demonstrated the original grantor's intent to include
use and placement of a dock within the easement's scope. Lennox
asked the court for a judgment (1) declaring the easement included
riparian rights for the dominant tenement holders, and (2) reflecting
Lennox's rights to store the dock on the easement and continue
historic dock placement at the end of the easement. The trial court
denied the Dyballs' motion for summary disposition, finding that the
easement was for ingress, egress, and riparian rights, and was not
limited to the right to maintain a dock on the lake end of the
easement.
On appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals, the Dyballs argued
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the trial court erred by considering the circumstances surrounding
Crane's deed because the easement's language was unambiguous. The
court had to determine whether, if the easement's language was
the trial court could consider surrounding
unambiguous,
circumstances. In Little v. Kin the Michigan Supreme Court held that
when the language of a legal instrument is plain and unambiguous,
the court must enforce it as written and inquire no further. Lennox
argued that the easement language "to the water's edge" created
ambiguity because it was traditional language for creating riparian
rights. Lennox failed to support his claim of ambiguity, and the court
of appeals found the easement was unambiguous; hence, the trial
court could not inquire into circumstances surrounding the easement
grant or the time of grant.
The court then had to determine whether the deed's
unambiguous language gave rise to riparian rights. According to the
court's interpretation of Thies v. Howland, the terms "ingress" and
''egress to the water's edge" did not demonstrate intent to grant
riparian rights. Prior Michigan case law established that permanently
mooring a boat and erecting and maintaining a dock near the water's
edge are riparian rights. Since the easement's plain and unambiguous
language did not permit Lennox to erect and maintain a dock or
permanently moor a boat, and since Lennox could not expand the
easement, the court held the trial court erred by granting Lennox
summary disposition and denying the Dyballs's motion to declare the
easement for access, and ingress and egress only.
Elizabeth Frost

NEBRASKA
Dep't of Natural Res. v. Bose, 267 Neb. 430 (Neb. 2004) (holding the
cancellation of a water appropriation right was proper where the
appropriators received sufficient notice, had not used the
appropriation for more than three consecutive years, and did not
demonstrate sufficient cause for nonuse).
The Nebraska Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") notified
Lee and Craig Bose, holders of a water appropriation right on the
Republican River, of a hearing to determine whether DNR would
cancel all or part of their water appropriation because of nonuse for
more than three consecutive years. The Boses attended the hearing at
which Lee Bose testified. Following the hearing, DNR's director
canceled the Boses' appropriation, concluding the testimony
established that the Boses' had not irrigated the land subject to the
appropriation from the River for more than three consecutive years.
The Boses appealed the DNR ruling to the Nebraska Supreme Court
contending (1) DNR did not provide adequate notice of the hearing;

